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Finance is a salient driver in promoting growth also by supporting changes in the specialization of 
production. Thus, it is paramount that finance goes to sunrise productive branches embodying more 
technology and so higher growth potential. Is it so in reality? 
We address this question by investigating the long-run allocation of bank loans in the bank-dependent Italian 
economy. We reach three main findings. First, banks lent more to the branches where value added was 
growing more rapidly, while loans went less to riskier sectors with higher bad loans ratios. Second, the 
allocation of loans was, however, insensitive to the growth of productivity and did not support the higher 
technology branches. Third, the allocation of loans to the more technology-oriented branches improved since 
the early 1990s, when credit markets were liberalized. 
Overall, in our assessment banks were rather following than leading productive transformations, but 
managed to avoid large scale misallocation of credit. Hence, we give banks just a pass grade. 
 
JEL codes: G20; G21; O30; O47. 






Finance for growth deals not only with the link between the increase in bank loans and real 
economic growth but also with the issue of credit allocation across industrial sectors, or more 
productive branches. Over time we have observed the sunrise of some sectors and the sunset of 
others. For instance, in recent decades information technology and biotechnology have become 
more important in most economies while the importance of traditional sectors has shrunk. Countries 
have reacted in different ways to these trends, depending, among many other factors, on the 
capacity to reallocate bank credit from declining sectors to emerging ones. This capacity is 
particularly crucial in countries – like Italy – where the Stock Exchange has a small size. Moreover, 
non-bank funds – such as those granted by venture capital and private equity operators – are still 
limited in Italy: this reinforces the role of banks for the financing of the business sector. Economic 
growth, which was very poor in Italy since the 1990s, depends on the capacity of businesses to 
incorporate and foster innovation (Visco, 2020).The delays accumulated in innovation and 
education and their interrelation with the structure of the productive system are probably at the 
origin of Italy’s weak economic growth. 
The purpose of this paper is to study bank credit allocation among branches of economic activity in 
Italy over a long-run horizon – from 1981 to 2017. In these almost 40 years some sectors shrank 
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while other sectors thrived. On one hand, some of the sunset sectors were part of the typical 
backbone of Italy’s light manufacturing industrialization of the postwar period. On the other hand, a 
common feature of the sunrise sectors was their high reliance on new technologies. Between 1981 
and 2017 the rank of the 16 productive branches we managed to reconstruct changed significantly 
in terms of their contribution to Italy’s total value added. The most vivid example of decline is 
offered by the branch Textiles, clothing and leather products, whose contribution to total value 
added dropped from 4.88% in 1981 to 2.06% in 2017 (Table 1). On the opposite, the strongest 
progress was recorded by the branch Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply, whose 
contribution expanded from 1.05% in 1981 to 2.17% in 2017. In passing, we can note that the 
technology content of the branch Textiles, clothing and leather products is the lowest. 
– Insert Table 1 about here – 
It goes without saying that the orderly redeployment of productive capacity from shrinking to 
expanding sectors needed bank loans to smooth out the process. Was this the case in reality? 
Namely, we ask whether the allocation of bank loans was consistent with that overarching shift 
from light manufacturing to the sectors more ingrained to a higher technology component. 
While Schumpeter (1912) was probably the first scholar to underline the key role of credit for the 
selection of good entrepreneurial projects, in recent years some contributions focused again on 
credit misallocation. The global financial crisis (GFC), the following Great Recession, the euro area 
sovereign debt crisis, and the failures of banks since 2007 are among the main motivations of this 
literature. We will not review the large literature on the nexus between finance and growth, 
focusing instead only on bank credit allocation. 
Bleck e Liu (2018) present a theoretical model showing that excessive credit expansion can benefit 
lower-frictioned – in terms of collateral – industrial sectors, crowding out higher-frictioned sectors. 
Therefore, misallocation of credit can contribute to underperformance of the aggregate economy. 
Wurgler (2000) looked at the allocation of credit across 65 countries. His main conclusion is that 
developed financial markets, as measured by the size of the domestic stock and credit markets 
relative to GDP, are associated with a better allocation of capital. Financially developed countries 
are swifter at both increasing investment in growing industries and decreasing investment in 
declining industries. 
Using a dataset that covers almost all bank-firm relationships in Italy in the period 2004-2013, 
Schivardi et al. (2017) study whether banks with low capital extended excessive credit to weak 
firms and if the phenomenon mattered for aggregate efficiency. They conclude that while banks 
with low capital can be an important source of aggregate inefficiency in the long run, their 
contribution to the severity of the Great Recession via capital misallocation was modest. 
Cingano and Hassan (2019) study the impact of international financial flows on credit allocation 
exploiting the strong increase of capital inflows in Italy in the first years of the new Millennium. 
They find that international financial flows did not contribute to increase misallocation through the 
bank lending channel. 
The paper that comes closest to ours is probably that by Battilossi et al. (2013). They study credit 
allocation across Italian industrial sectors between 1948 and 2009, assuming that an efficient 
allocation takes into account the variation of sectoral growth opportunities, as revealed by stock 
market data. Their results show that allocative efficiency was higher during the Italian postwar 
boom (1950s-1960s), deteriorated in the over-regulation era (1970s-1980s) and rose again with the 
financial liberalization of the early 1990s.  However, the thrust of Battilossi et al.’s analysis may be 
questioned because of the fact that in Italy the size of the stock market has always been rather small 
throughout the studied period. 
Our contribution to the extant literature is threefold. First, and preliminary to the empirical analysis, 
through painstaking work we build the longest and more detailed available time series of the 
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sectoral level variables employed in our regressions. Second, through the considered nearly 40 
years, we investigate whether bank loans were actually dispensed to the most deserving sectors, that 
is those sectors with expanding trajectories and/or more productive and/or embodying more 
advanced technology. Third, we test whether loan allocation was affected by institutional 
innovations and/or by business cycle patterns. 
Our results show some nuances. On the positive side, we document that banks lent more to the 
sectors where value added was growing more rapidly, while loans were expanded less to more risky 
sectors, as captured by their higher bad loans shares. On the negative side, we uncover that the 
allocation of loans was negatively related – or at best insensitive – to the sectoral growth of 
productivity and fell short of serving the higher technology sectors. However, there are signs that 
the allocation of loans to the more technology-oriented sectors improved after the liberalization of 
the credit markets of the 1990s. 
The paper is divided in 7 Sections. Following this Introduction, Section 2 accomplishes two tasks. 
First, it describes the many hurdles tackled in reconstructing sectoral level data and presents 
descriptive statistics of the time series we obtained; second, it presents the overall thrust of our 
empirical analysis. In Section 3, we depict the macroeconomic context and present some 
preliminary evidence based on graphic representations. Section 4 develops our main testable 
hypotheses and unfolds our regression model specifications. Section 5 reports and comments our 
main empirical results. In Section 6 we provide some robustness checks by investigating the links 
among investments, loans and productivity in the long run. Finally, Section 7 synthesizes the main 
conclusions, exposing key caveats and offering suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
 
First of all, we assembled a data set on bank loans and bank bad loans. While previous papers 
usually looked at the allocation of credit between only two aggregate sectors, typically households 
and firms, we use more disaggregated data which refer to branches of economic activity. This is a 
much finer classification which is available for non-financial corporations and for producer-
households. Our data set spans from 1981 to 2017 and comprises the following 16 branches of 
economic activity: 
1 Agriculture, forestry and fishing; 
2 Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply; 
3 Basic metals, fabricated metal products and non-metallic mineral products; 
4 Refined petroleum products, chemical products and pharmaceuticals; 
5 Machinery and equipment; 
6 Electronics products, electrical and non-electrical equipment and apparatus; 
7 Motor vehicles and other transport equipment; 
8 Food, beverages and tobacco products; 
9 Textiles, clothing and leather products; 
10 Paper, paper products and printing; 
11 Rubber and plastic products; 
12 Construction; 
13 Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
14 Accommodation and food service activities; 
15 Transportation and storage, Information and communication; 
16 All remaining activities. 
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In order to build our series, we matched the most recent data, from 2001 to 2017 and for the above 
mentioned 16 branches we managed to weld them with older series, that span from 1981 to 2008. 
We operated in two steps. The first elaboration has been useful for matching the actual statistical 
classification with the previous one, given that the branches have changed during the time. Then, in 
order to avoid series discontinuities, we prolonged the most recent series, that end in 2001, adopting 
the percentage change of the older ones for the period 1981-2001. Adopting this procedure, we 
assembled the series of gross bank loans and bad loans for the above mentioned 16 branches, taking 
into account both non-financial corporations and producer-households. 
The same approach has been used also to collect non-banking series, that is: value added, number of 
branch employees, productivity, stock of capital and investments for each branch. Indeed, even for 
these data a change in classification and a discontinuity in the data set published by ISTAT exists. 
Our data set is completed with macroeconomic data covering the same period: GDP real growth;  
inflation rate (source Istat); Banca d’Italia discount rate until 1998 and European Central Bank main 
refinancing operation rate since 1999; Italian banks capital and total assets (source Banca d’Italia). 
Only for real GDP we used the same approach seen before for reconstructing the series, while 
complete series are available without any discontinuity in the other cases. 
Therefore, the dataset we employed is a panel with 16 branches, 37 years, 7 variables per branch 
and a set of 4 macroeconomic variables. 
We also generate a series of dummy variables: 1) a dummy for each branch; 2) a dummy for each 
year; 3) a dummy for each specific time period: dummy boom1, from 1981 to 1991, dummy crisis1, 
from 1992 to 1995, dummy boom2, from 1996 to 2006, and dummy crisis2, from 2007 to 2017; 4) 
a dummy for the period 1991-2017 that covers the years after the liberalization of the Italian 
banking system; 5) five dummies for the different technological content of the production of each 
branch: dummy tec1 for branches 1 and 2, dummy tec2, for branches 3 and 8, dummy tec3 for 
branches 9 and 10, dummy tec4 for branches 4, 5 and 7, and dummy tec5 for branch 6. 
 
Figure 1. Real GDP growth, inflation rate, loans* to 16 branches percentage change 
 
 
Source: our elaborations on Banca d’Italia and Istat data. *We consider the sum of net loans of the 16 sectors (total 
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The five tech dummies follow the classification by Lall (2000), based on the technological content 
of the sectors, going from the primary products (tec1), resource-based manufactures (tec2), low-
technology manufactures (tec3), medium-technology manufactures (tec4), and high-technology 
manufactures (tec5). The latter sectors are those which experienced the highest growth rates 
worldwide in the latest decades. So, this classification allows to investigate to what extent Italian 
banks supported the transition from traditional sectors to the leading sectors of the third industrial 
revolution. Notice that this classification does not include all the sectors and it does not take 
account of the large variation in technological content that may exist within each sector. However, 
we maintain that the differences among sectors are more relevant than those within each sector.
2 
 
3. Economic context and preliminary evidence 
 
We can roughly split the nearly 40 years under investigation in four periods: 
(i) Economic growth and credit growth were both high in the 1980s.  
(ii) The previous phase was interrupted by the recession of 1992-93. The recession hit mostly 
Southern banks; some intermediaries went bankrupt while others were bailed-out, through 
the intervention of State funds and the acquisitions by Centre-Northern banks.  
(iii) In the 1990s banking markets were liberalized. Opening of branches was liberalised in 
1990. A new Banking Code was approved in 1993. Banks were progressively privatised. 
The changes in regulation ended the “financial repression era” introduced in the 1930s, as 
a consequence of the Great Depression, and lasted until the 1980s (see De Bonis et al., 
2018). After the explosion of bad loans caused by the 1992-93 recession, credit allocation 
and credit quality improved. Credit growth was satisfactory – in line with the euro area 
average – from the second half of the 1990s until the eruption of the GFC in 2007-2008. 
 
Figure 2. Relationship between value added and loans, 16 sectors. 
 
 
Note: y = loans percentage change 1981-2019, x = value added percentage change 1981-2019. Metallurgical, paper and 
plastics industries 1981-2017. 
 
(iv) The Italian economy was hit by the GFC; in 2009 the contraction of GDP was the strongest 
since the end of the Second World War. Following the brief recovery of 2010, the euro 
area debt sovereign crisis hit Italy since the second half of 2011. The economy was in 
recession until 2013. Many firms failed and a credit crunch took place. Credit growth to 
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the private sector was negative from the second half of 2012 to 2015. The growth of credit 
improved  from 2016. Overall the Great Recession (2007-2013) was in Italy worse than the 
Great Depression (1929-1936) in terms of contraction of real GDP, investments and 
consumption. During the Great Recession credit quality worsened but bank failures were 
less frequent and less intense than during the Great Depression (De Bonis et al., 2020).  
 
While it is not easy to see a clear association at the aggregate level between growth rates of loans 
and the rate of growth of GDP and the inflation rate, Figure 1 helps detect some response in terms 
of loan growth in correspondence of business cycle expansions, such as in the late 1980s; around 
1994-95, assisting the recovery from the 1992-93 recession; and in 2005-07, before the eruption of 
the GFC. The picture also shows the consequences of the recessionary phases, for instance in 1992, 
2009, and 2012-13. It is also comforting to notice that sectoral data identify a positive relationship 
between the percentage change of loans and that of value added throughout the four examined 
decades (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 3. Relationship between productivity and loans, 16 branches  
 
 
Note: y = loans percentage change 1981 2019, x = productivity percentage change 1981 2019. Metallurgical, paper and 
plastics industries 1981-2017 
 
Figure 4. Relationship between interest rates and bad loans to total loans ratio, 16 branches  
 
Source: y = average bad loans to total loans ratio, 1998 - 2018, x = average interest rate on loans, 1998 – 2018. 
 
However, we note that, on branch data, the relationship between the percentage change of loans and 
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At the same time, we see that, on sectoral data, the relationship between interest rates on loans and 
bad loans ratios is strongly positive through the nearly 20 years (Figure 4) – suggesting that, 
overall, credit risk was correctly priced by banks – while loans increased more to the sectors that 
were paying lower loan rates (Figure 5). 
Figure 5. Relationship between interest rates and loans, 16 branches  
 
 
Source: y = loans percentage change, 1998 - 2018, x = average interest rate on loans, 1998 - 2019. 
 
 
4. Hypotheses and Regression Models Specifications 
 
In the last forty years, the most advanced economies underwent two main structural changes. First, 
they experienced a rapid increase of the relevance of the most intensive technological sectors. 
Second, advanced economies lost market shares in low-medium technological sectors, to the 
advantage of the emerging economies. As said, our statistics show the same shifts in Italy. 
The capability of the financial system of a country to reallocate finance from declining to the 
expanding and more innovative sectors has a major impact on the macroeconomic performance of 
the country. 
The correlation between allocation of finance and sectorial performance indicators is relevant both 
whether finance spurs the growth of the more innovative sectors or it follows the latter, by 
supporting the sectors that proved to be more capable to grow and innovate. 
We investigate the nexus between finance and sectorial growth in a bank-based financial system, 
where loans are the main or the only source of finance for firms. In this context, we study the 
allocative efficiency of the banking system of the country in a long run perspective, by addressing 
to what extent the allocation of loans among sectors is in line with the growth of value added, 
productivity and technological intensity of the sector. 
In detail we test three hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Banks allocate a higher proportion of loans to the most productive sectors, 
accounting for firms’ risks. 
 
There is evidence that better opportunities for investment exist in sectors with higher increase of 
value added and productivity than in declining sectors. Wurgler (2000) shows that in most 
developed countries investments increase more in the expanding sectors and decrease more in the 
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to exploit the opportunity for growth in countries with more developed financial systems. In 
addition, Fishman and Love (2004) examine the role of financial market development in 
intersectoral allocation when there exist common global shocks to growth opportunities. They prove 
that two countries have more highly correlated growth rates across sectors when both countries have 
well-developed financial markets. Consequently, banks’ allocative efficiency implies their 
capability to reallocate loan portfolios from sunset to sunrise sectors or to sectors with higher 
opportunities for investment. 
Banks use several criteria to allocate loans, and the expected revenue of the investment may not be 
the only determinants or even the most important ones. Risk, size, age, collaterals, liquidity, 
leverage of a firm or relationship lending may be more relevant than the allocation of loans to the 
most productive sectors (Schiantarelli et al., 1996). Dörr et al. (2017) examine the implications for 
firm productivity of adverse shocks to bank lending in Italy, and find a negative shock to bank 
credit supply reduces firms' loan growth, investment, capital-to-labor ratio, and productivity. But 
Linarello et al. (2018) find for the period 2000-2015 only a negligible effect of credit shocks on 
aggregate productivity of the Italian firms. By contrast, Hassan et al. (2017) show that capital 
misallocation by banks can be a key driver of the long-standing slow productivity growth that 
characterizes Italy and other periphery countries. And Calligaris et al. (2016) find that the extent of 
misallocation has substantially increased since 1995. 
By relying on firm level data, the cited papers may bestow stronger identification underpinnings 
compared to our sector-level analysis. At the same time, those papers use data for much shorter 
periods than the long-term period our sectorial data allow investigating and, thus, our methodology 
may be superior in terms of identifying long-run trends. 
We posit that the banking system of the country allocates a higher proportion of loans to those 
sectors with better relative performance in terms of value added and productivity. The increase in 
total loans to the sector may precede or follow the increase in value added and productivity of the 
sector. However, the higher the capability of the banking system to spur the most dynamic and 
productive sectors the stronger is the role of banks in supporting the transition of the economy to 
new technological paradigms. 





+ α∆(/)+α∆(NPL/NPL)  +α(KAPITAL/Total Assets)t + 
α  1+α  2 + α!3 + α#4 + α % 5 + α'()*+,-t + α./0t +εst             (1) 
The dependent variable is the yearly change of the ratio between loans to each sector and loans to 
all sectors. The first regressor is the delta of the ratio of the sectorial labor productivity relative to 
total productivity; the second independent variable is the delta of the ratio of value added relative to 
total value added, while the third is the delta of the ratio of non-performing loans of the sector 
relative to all sectors. KAPITAL/Total Assets is a measure of the capability of banks to provide 
loans, while the dummies capture the technological content of the sectors, going from the lowest 
(tec1) to the highest (tec5) technological-content sectors. The latter are those with the highest 
opportunities for growth. We expect that the coefficients α and α are positive and significant, 
reflecting higher support of the banks to the most productive sectors. In addition, we expect the sign 
of α   and  α   to be negative, while the coefficients α#  and α% to be positive, based on the 
assumption that in this period banks switched loans from low-tech to the high-tech sectors. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Banks increase lending more to high-tech than low-tech sectors. 
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In the period under investigation, the opportunities for investment in the world economy shifted 
from low-medium tech sectors to high-tech sectors (i.e., electrical machineries and electronics, 
telecommunication, biotechnology, etc.). So, a great deal of opportunities for growth of the Italian 
economy were determined by the capabilities to adapt to this technological shift. 
The common view (Battilossi et al., 2011) is that the Italian economy managed grasping the growth 
opportunities generated by the global technological shocks up to the 1970s, but this capability 
weakened starting from the 1980s (the period of our investigation). More precisely, Battilossi et al. 
(2011) investigate the link between bank loans and opportunities for growth of the sectors 
(measured by stock prices over earning of the sector) for the Italian economy in the period 1948-
2009.They find that the coefficient of cointegration of the two variables is positive and significant 
only in the periods 1948-1970 and 1995-2009, but not in the period 1971-1994. 
Consistent with the view that banks shifted in this period the allocation of loans from low- to high-
tech sectors, we expect in the equation below that the coefficients for dummies 4 and 5 are positive, 
and for dummies 1 and 2 are negative. 
 
∆%Lst= α0 + α∆%
	
	
+ α∆% + α∆%/5 +α(KAPITAL/Total Assets)t +α  1  + 
α2  + α ! 3  +  α # 4 +  α % 5  + α'6)t   + α()*+,-t   +  α./0t + εst          (2) 
∆% is percentage change of the variable.3 
Even though in the above equations we assume that the allocation of loans is affected by the relative 
performance of the sectors, it may be also the case that the former determines the latter. Hence, we 
performed Granger causality tests on equations 1-2 above. On the other hand, the allocation of loans 
is more likely to be determined by the supply side conditions, if structural changes occur in the 
financial system. 
Indeed, there is large evidence that the nature of banks as well as market structure and regulations 
are important determinants of allocative efficiency. In the 1990s the Italian banking system 
underwent major changes, following the liberalization and privatization of the main banks. So, our 
data allow to investigate whether the Italian banking system had a more active role in the 
developments of the Italian economy after the implementation of the new banking reforms.  
  
Hypothesis 3. Liberalization and privatization of banks increases the allocation of loans to the most 
productive sectors. 
 
Studies on both emerging markets (Jaramillo et al., 1995; Galindo et al., 2007) and developed 
countries (Laeven, 2003) provide evidence that financial markets’ liberalization improves allocative 
efficiency and reduces credit rationing. Battilossi et al. (2011) confirmed these conclusions with 
respect to the effects of liberalization and privatization of Italian banks, by showing that after 1990 
the allocation of loans across sectors is more in line with the growth opportunities of the sectors.
4
 
In the previous equations we established a direct link between credit and sectorial productivity. 
However, the latter is determined by investments and innovations. Hence, an efficient allocation of 
loans implies that there is also a positive correlation between loans to a sector and the amount of 
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 Equation 2 is based on less stringent assumptions about loan portfolio allocation. Equation 1 assumes that banks 
allocate loans to each sector in order to equate expected returns in each sector. By contrast, equation 2 assumes that 
banks react to change in expected revenue of one sector irrespective to revenues in the other sectors. 
4
 However, the new banking law expanded also the scope of operation of the banks, which may have also increased the 
incentive to switch from lending to other activities. 
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investment and innovation of the sector. By contrast, zombie lending (see Caballero et al., 2006, 
Schivardi et al., 2017) may depress the investment and employment growth of non-zombie sectors 
and widen the productivity gap between zombie and non-zombie sectors. So, following among 
others Caggese (2016) and Manaresi and Pierri (2017), we assume there is a direct effect of credit 
on firm’s investments. 
We test the correlation between lending and investments by the following: 
789:;<=
789:;






+ G;                     (3) 
Equation 3 assumes that investments in each sector can be financed by internal funding (proxied by 
the increase in the realized value added of the sector) and by bank loans. We posit that an increase 
of both sources of funding spurs investments.  But if banks in a prolonged depression misallocate 
credit to weak firms operating in declining sectors (zombie lending), loans may not have a 
significant impact on investments. 
A more clear-cut picture of the role of finance for growth may emerge when we analyze lending to 
innovative activities. Indeed, innovations deal only with those activities capable to create new 
markets or more efficient methods of production, which have a greater impact on growth.
5
 
To study the effects of bank lending on the amount of innovation of the sector, first we estimate the 
aggregate production function by sector, and then we use the estimated Solow residual of each 
sector to test the following relationship: 
 
△ RESIDSOLOW:;P= = ?@ + ?= △ DEA8F:; +  ?C1  +  α2  + α  3  +  α  4 +
 α  5  + α!()*+,-t   +  α#./0t + G;         (4) 
 
We assume that the increase in bank loans spurs the amount of innovation of the sector, measured 
by the Solow residual. Manaresi and Pierri (2017), using a matched bank-firm panel data covering 
the period 1998-2012, show that an expansion of credit supply to Italian manufacturers' production 
increases both input accumulation (size effect) and the ability to generate value added for a given 
level of inputs (productivity effect). 
However, several other factors may affect the relationship between loans and investments. One is 
the different need for external finance across sectors. 
To investigate this issue, we performed the following exercise (see Section 6). Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) built up an index of the need of external finance for the industrial sectors of the US 
economy. Assuming that the dependence from external finance is similar for the Italian sectors, we 
studied whether the allocation of loans by Italian banks is in line with the need of external finance 
of the sectors. Among other things, this methodology offers additional insights on the allocation of 
loans between high and low-tech sectors in the last forty years of the Italian economy. 
 
5. Main Results 
 
We attempt to uncover the possible relationship over time between the allocation of bank loans, on 
one hand, and, on the other, the evolution of sectoral performance indicators as well as sectoral 
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 Indeed, innovations are riskier and more rewarding activities, and the financing of innovation depends on the average 
degree of risk-aversion of the banks. 
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specific identifiers. The evolution of bank loans through time is described by one of the following 
two (see Table 2 for a list and definitions of all the variables and their basic descriptive values): 
i) the change in the share of the total loans accruing to a specific sector i at time t, DLSHit = 
(Loanit/Loant), where Loanit is loans to the sector and Loant is total loans to all sectors; 
ii) the percentage rate of growth of loans to a specific sector i at time t (DPLOANit). 
 
The relevant sector-level regressors we consider are the following: 
- the change in the share of the value added in a specific sector i at time t, DVARATit = 
(VAit/VAt), where VAit is the value added of the sector and VAt is total value added of all 
sectors. DVARATit aims to capture the relative ability of a sector to create value added – be 
it because of its efficiency, innovativeness, market power or else – which could be viewed 
as a proxy of the sector’s ability to pay back the loans it receives; 
- the change in the ratio of labor productivity in a sector to average labor productivity across 
all sectors, DNPRODRATit = [(VAit/Nit) / (VAt/Nt)], where Nit (Nt) is the number of 
employees of the sector (across all sectors). DNPRODRATit measures the change in relative 
labor productivity of a sector which could be viewed as a proxy of the sector’s efficiency; 
- the change in the share of the bad loans in a specific sector i at time t, DBADLRATit = 
(BADLit/BADLt), where BADLit is bad loans of the sector and BADLt is total bad loans of 
all sectors. DBADLRATit aims to capture the ex post relative risk of a sector which could 
discourage banks from lending to that sector; 
- the percentage rate of growth of value added in a specific sector i at time t (DPVAit); 
- the percentage rate of growth of labor productivity in a specific sector i at time t 
(DNPRODit); 
- the percentage rate of growth of bad loans to a specific sector i at time t (DPBADLit); 
- a set of dummies – TEC1, TEC2, TEC3, TEC4, TEC5 – identifying the more technically 
innovative sectors. 
 
We also include some macroeconomic or system-level variables as follows: 
- the rate of inflation (INFLt); 
- the rate of growth of real GDP (RGGt); 
- the banking system’s capital/asset ratio (CAPASSRATt), where CAPASSRATt = CAPt / 
ASSt with CAPt being total capital and ASSt being total assets; 
- the change of the banking system’s capital/asset ratio (DCAPASSRATt); 
- the percentage rate of growth of the banking system’s capital/asset ratio (DPCAPASSRATt); 
- a dummy variable marking the liberalization of the Italian banking system (LIBt=0 until 
1989 and LIBt =1 from 1990); 
- three dummy variables singling out major deviations from the GDP trend: CRISIS1 
represents the 1992-1995 period, BOOM covers the 1996-2006 period and CRISIS2 is the 
dummy for the period 2007-2019; 
- five dummy variables – TEC1, TEC2, TEC3, TEC4, TEC5 – identifying the sectors which 
express a higher technological content, where the tech content supposedly increases from 1 
to 5; 
- the Bank of Italy discount rate and the ECB main refinancing operations rate (DR). 
 
– Insert Table 2 about here – 
Relating to Hypothesis 1 and Equation 1, the results obtained in our regressions lend themselves to 
easy interpretations. Namely, the change in the share of loans accruing to the individual sector 
(DLSH) seems to respond positively and significantly to the change in the share of value added of 
the sector on total value added (DVARAT) – as found for Model 1 and Model 2 – but not to the 
more relevant change in the ratio of labor productivity in a sector to average labor productivity 
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across all sectors (DNPRODRAT) – as shown in for Model 3 and Model 4 (Table 3). Thus, there is 
no strong support for our Hypothesis 1. 
For the other covariates, we can notice that the change in the share of the bad loans in a specific 
sector (DBADLRAT) turns out positively and significantly related to DLSH for the first three 
Models – the difference between Model 1 and Model 2 is that DBADLRAT is lagged in Model 2 – 
but not for Model 4. GDP growth (RGG) and inflation (INFL) are not significantly related to 
DLSH. Regarding the tech dummies (TEC1, TEC2, TEC3, TEC4, TEC5) they are often significant 
and negative, suggesting that loan shares have generally increased less in the technologically 
advanced sectors. Thus, there is no support for our Hypothesis 2. 
The Crisis and Boom dummies are not statistically significant per se, but when we interact them 
with DVARAT – the same does not hold for DNPRODRAT – results show that the growth of 
DLSH was significantly lower during the two crisis periods identified by CRISIS1 and CRISIS2. 
Finally, in Model 4, the dummy capturing the possible time break due to the liberalization of the 
credit market since 1990 (LIB) is significantly related to DLSH but bears a counterintuitive 
negative sign, suggesting that loan sector shares did not increase more after the liberalization. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to observe that, once interacted with the tech dummies, LIB deploys 
positive and significant effects, hinting that loan sector shares have increased more in the 
technology intensive sector after the banking liberalization. This last evidence provides moderate 
support for our Hypothesis 3. 
Although all the models seem to be appropriate – as evidenced by the F statistics – their goodness 
of fit is low, as shown by the very low R-squares. 
– Insert Table 3 about here – 
A specific issue here and below is the potential endogeneity between the dependent and explanatory 
variables, which might lead to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. We tested the presence 
of endogenous regressors via Hausman tests
6
 and found endogeneity in 5 out of 6 regressors tested. 
Hence, we re-estimated all our models (models labeled with -B) by replacing the initial regressors 
with substitute variables. For each initial variable, we obtained the new regressor by calculating the 




Looking at Table 4, we are now focusing on Hypothesis 2 and Equation 2 and can notice that some 
of the findings shown for DLSH carry over to the growth of sectoral loans (DPLOAN). 
Specifically, in Model 5 DPLOAN associates positively and significantly with DPVA, the sectoral 
growth of value added, albeit neither with DNPROD, the sectoral growth of value added per 
employee, nor with the growth of our ex-post measure of risk, DPBADL. Again, there is no strong 
support for our Hypothesis 1. The TEC dummies are negatively associated with DPLOAN, some of 
them reaching significant levels, suggesting that the allocation of sectoral loans does not seem to 
have favored the more technologically oriented sectors. Once more, there is no support for our 
Hypothesis 2. 
                                                          
6
 To carry out the test we re-estimated our models using all the independent variables, in turns, as dependent one. We 
then used residuals of these models as regressors in the original equations in order to check if the residuals were 
significant. 
7
 To have large enough groups, we merged the Tec1 and Tec2 groups and the Tec 3, Tec 4 and Tec 5 groups. In this 
way every variable of a sector belonging to Tec1 or Tec2 groups has been substituted by the average values of the other 
sectors included in Tec1 and Tec2. The same procedure was used for branches in the other technological groups. For 
example, instead of using the change in bad loans of the agricultural sector, we employed, as regressor for agriculture, 
the change in the sum of bad loans of all other sectors belonging to the Tec1 and Tec2 groups. The same approach was 
applied to every sectoral variable. This approach was previously used by Caprio et al. (2007) and Laeven and Levine 
(2009). 
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In this model as well as in all the subsequent ones, we notice that: i) INFL is positively ad 
significantly associated with DPLOAN, bearing a relatively stable coefficient; ii) the goodness of fit 
is much higher than for the models of Table 3. The only change of Model 6 with respect to Model 5 
consists in introducing the change in the capital/asset ratio of the banks (DCAPASSRAT), which 
turns out positive and significant, as expected. 
Model 7, instead, considers the possibly different behavior over the three time periods characterized 
by pronounced output volatility, CRISIS1, BOOM, and CRISIS2. Although the three dummies 
seem rather insignificant – only CRISIS2 reaches statistical significance and just at 10% – it is 
interesting to note that the interaction of DPVA with these dummies is positive and significant, 
while this associates with a significant but negative coefficient of DPVA. Moreover, the size of the 
coefficient of DPVA per se is always smaller than the size of the coefficients of its interactions with 
the dummies. This hints that banks seem to have favored high-value-added-growth sectors mostly 
during the time periods of more intense output variation. These latter results apply also to Model 8, 
whose main innovation with respect to Model 7 consists in introducing the TEC dummies as well. 
Indeed, the effect of the TEC dummies is analogous to what detected in Model 6. 
In turn, the two main innovations of Model 9 regard abandoning DPVA in favor of DNPROD, the 
growth of value added per employee, and the introduction of the dummy LIB and of its interactions 
with the TEC dummies, as previously done in Model 4. This time around, DNPROD is significant 
but negative, suggesting that the allocation of credit does not favor the sectors with high DNPROD. 
A more encouraging finding, here, is that DPBADL is not only negative but also significant – albeit 
at 10% only – implying that banks have lent less to riskier sectors. Alongside, the results for the 
TEC dummies, the LIB dummy and the interactions among the two turn out more or less analogous 
to what found for Model 4. Again, this last evidence provides moderate support for our Hypothesis 
3. 
– Insert Table 4 about here – 
Overall, the results of these regressions find both shadows and lights. The shadows are that banks’ 
allocation of credit seems to have favored neither the sectors where productivity – value added per 
employee – was increasing above average nor the sectors featuring higher technological content – 
which are normally expected to enjoy higher competitiveness.
8
 However, we found also some 
lights. Namely, the allocation of credit does not seem to have been systematically higher in more 
risky sectors – along the possible hypothesis of banks financing zombie firms (Acharya et al., 2019) 
–, on the contrary, at times we detect that banks reduce loan extension to more risky sectors. 
Moreover, banks appear to have generally increased their lending to the TEC sectors after the 
banking liberalization. Finally, the orientation of credit to the high-value-added-growth sectors has 
intensified during the phases of more pronounced output variation, which are the times when credit 
is more needed for either expanding or restructuring, consistently with the view that banks grant 
flexibility in the use of their loans, rather than causing a credit crunch. 
 
6. Investments, loans and productivity in the long run 
Here we perform further cross-branch analyses on how the allocation of bank loans relates to 
investment, productivity and external finance dependence. These further analyses may offer 
additional robustness checks to our previous findings. 
In the first place, we follow up on Equation 3 and study the possible relationship between 
investments and bank loan dynamics. The results of the regression estimates are reported in Table 5. 
They show that the dynamics of investments is generally unrelated to that of bank loans and, in 
                                                          
8
 Consistent with this conclusion, Coccorese and Silipo (2015) find that between 1980 and 2010 the great expansion of 
Italian financial markets and institutions did have a positive effect on regional economic performance, but overall 
growth rates were nevertheless low. 
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Model 1B, it even emerges a significant negative association between the two variables. The 
prevailing evidence from this specification seems to corroborate the results commented in the 
previous Sections. In other words, no strong role emerges for bank loans in promoting investment. 
– Insert Table 5 about here – 
Secondly, we consider that the dynamics of value added and even that of labor productivity are 
variables that can be improved to measure the true growth potential. Specifically following the 
literature, we run a growth regression where the regressors are the capital and labor inputs at the 
branch level. From this regression, it is possible to estimate the Solow residuals – representing the 
growth of value added not accounted for by changes in either capital or labor – usually associated 
with technical progress. The results of this regression estimates are reported in Table 6, where 
naturally both explanatory variables are highly significant and together are able to explain a 
noticeable part of the variance of the dependent variable, as revealed by the relatively high R
2
. 
– Insert Table 6 about here – 
Next, we run a regression to assess the relationship between the Solow residuals and the dynamics 
of bank loans to the sector, together with other control variables. The results, reported in Table 7, 
show that the dynamics of bank loans is negatively associated with the dependent variable, which is 
instead positively linked with GDP growth, with inflation, and with the dummy TEC1. Thus, it 
seems that bank loans were not allocated to the branches with higher growth potential, as identified 
by larger Solow residuals. A caveat is in order here. Namely, the finding that only low level of 
technology – TEC1 is the dummy identifying the lowest technology component – seem to enhance 
the Solow residuals is somewhat counterintuitive. In any case, the evidence from this specification 
seems to corroborate the results commented in the previous Sections. In other words, no strong role 
emerges for bank loans in promoting technological progress. 
– Insert Table 7 about here – 
In addition, an alternative approach to assess the link between finance and growth is provided by 
Rajan and Zingales (1998). They build up an index of the need of external finance for the US 
industrial sectors, and they show that sectors or firms more in need of finance are more likely to 
growth in more developed financial systems. In addition, they provide a few reasons why external 
finance in the same sectors in other advanced countries is similar to the US (see Rajan and Zingales, 
1998). Hence, assuming that similar sectors in Italy have similar financial needs than in the US, we 
classified sectors according to their financial needs, and we computed to what extend the sectors 
more in need of external finance are also those which received the highest amount of loans relative 
to investment expenditure. Among other things, this methodology offers additional insights on the 
allocation of loans between high and low-tech sectors in the last forty years of the Italian economy. 
External dependence is the fraction of capital expenditures not financed with cash-flow from 
operations. So, using the external dependence indicators reported in Table 1 of Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), we built up dependence indexes for nine branches of the Italian industrial sector.  
In addition, we constructed the ratio of loans over fixed investments, as a proxy of banking support 
to the branch. We expect that the demand for investment is equally accommodated by banks if 
branches more in needs of external finance are also those receiving more loans relative to their 
investments. So, we classify branches according to their relative intensity of financial dependence 
and the relative value of loans/fixed investments. The results are reported in the following table.  
– Insert Table 8 about here – 
The general conclusion from Table 8 is that branches with greater external finance dependence are 
not those receiving greater support from the banks. Indeed, leather, footwear and textile branches 
are among the last in external financial needs, but they get the highest support from the Italian 
banking system. By contrast, those with greater external dependence are among those less 
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supported by the banks (drugs, electrical machineries, etc.). Overall, the rank correlation of external 
dependence and share of loans received is strong and negative (equal to –0.688) though the small 
number of branches (9) for which it was possible to reconstruct the matching with Rajan-Zingales 
does not allow to tell whether this correlation is statistically significant. Incidentally, the branches 
with greater external dependence are also those with the highest technological content. Indeed, the 
rank correlation of the two variables is strong and positive (equal to 0.642) even though, for the 
reason just mentioned, it is impossible to tell if this correlation is statistically significant. The last 
result sheds additional light on the econometric evidence above, showing an adverse effect of 
technological content on bank lending to the branch. 
Finally, we performed a set of Granger causality tests to ascertain whether any causality links could 
be inferred between pairs of the main variables considered in our analysis. The results, reported in 
the Appendix, allow us to identify, first, the existence of a Granger causality going: 
- at macro level, from growth of GDP (RGG) to growth of total loans (DPLOAN) – lag 2; 
- in a sector, from labor productivity growth (DNPROD) to growth of loans (DPLOAN) – lag 2. 
Second, we identify feedback effects – i.e., both variables reinforce each other in a sector – for: 
- the changes in the shares of bad loans (DBADLRAT) and of total loans (DLSH) – lag 2; 
- the changes in the shares of value added (DVARAT) and of total loans (DLSH) – lag 2; 
- growth of value added (DPVA) and growth of loans (DPLOAN) – lag 2; 
- growth of loans (DPLOAN) and labor productivity growth (DNPROD) – lag 1; 
- labor productivity growth (DNPROD) and growth of loans (DPLOAN) – lag 4. 
Third, we identify the other three pairs as mutually unrelated in a sector for: 
- growth of bad loans (DPBADL) and growth of loans (DPLOAN) – lag 2; 
- growth of value added (DPVA) and labor productivity growth (DNPROD) – lag 2; 
- labor productivity growth (DNPROD) and growth of loans (DPLOAN) – lag 3. 
To sum up, the Granger causality results generally support the view that bank loans are following 
impulses from the real economy – both GDP growth and, within a sector, labor productivity growth 
– or moving together in the various identified feedback links. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
Economic growth over time demands the evolution of the productive system from sun setting to 
sunrise sectors. Finance is one of the main drivers to enable such evolution in the specialization of 
production. Thus, it is paramount that finance goes to sunrise productive branches embodying more 
technology and so higher growth potential. Is this requirement certified by the actual experience? 
Since Italy’s financial system is bank-based, we addressed this issue by studying the long-run 
allocation of bank loans  looking at the financing of  branches of economic activity in the last 40 
years. 
We built the longest and more detailed available time series of the sectoral level variables. Then  we 
investigated whether bank loans were actually dispensed to the most deserving sectors, that is those 
sectors with expanding trajectories and/or more productive and/or embodying more advanced 
technology. Moreover we tested whether loan allocation was affected by institutional innovations 
and/or by business cycle patterns.   
Our results show some nuances. On the positive side,  banks lent more to the sectors where value 
added was growing more rapidly while loans were expanded less to more risky sectors, as captured 
by their higher bad loans. On the negative side, we uncover that the allocation of loans was 
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negatively related – or at best insensitive – to the sectoral growth of productivity and fell short of 
serving the higher technology sectors. However, there are signs that the allocation of loans to the 
more technology-oriented sectors increased after the liberalization of the credit markets of the 
1990s. 
The general thrust of the previous claims has been further supported by alternative specifications 
which we have performed in relating bank loans to investments, or to the Solow residuals, as well in 
taking the branch allocation of bank loans to the test of the index of external finance dependence 
proposed by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Instead, the Granger causality analysis led to a more 
benevolent view on the link between branch growth and bank loans. 
Overall, our assessment leads us to conclude that banks were rather following than leading 
productive transformations, but managed to avoid large scale misallocation of credit. Hence, we 
give banks just a pass grade. 
Although we cannot claim that our results are wholly generalizable, the case of Italy might have 
implications for other bank-based financial systems. Indeed, extending the study to other countries 
would be an interesting avenue for future research. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A – Dataset  
Variable - abbreviation Description, unit of measure, sample Source 
Loans - LOAN Total net loans to 16 sectors, millions of euros, current 
values, 1981-2017  
Banca d’Italia 
Bad loans - BADL Gross bad loans of 16 sectors, millions of euros, current 
values, 1981-2017 
Banca d’Italia 
Value added - VA Value added at factor costs of 16 sectors, millions of 
euros, current values, 1981-2017  
Istat 
Employees - N Total employees, thousands, 1981-2017 Istat 
Assets - CAPSEC Stock of non financial assets of 16 sectors, millions of 
euros, current replacement cost, 1981-2017 
Istat 
Investments - INVSEC Gross fixed capital formation of 16 sectors, millions of 
euros, 1981-2017 
Istat 
Real GDP - RG Gross domestic product of Italy, costant value-2015 base 
year, millions of euros, 1981-2017. 
Istat 
Capital and reserves – 
CAP 
Italian banking system Capital and reserves, millions of 
euros, current price, 1981-2017 
Banca d’Italia 
Total asset – ASS Italian banking system total asset, millions of euros, 
current price, 1984-2017 
Banca d’Italia 
Inflation - INF Rate of inflation, index 2015=100, 1981-2017. Istat 
Discount rate – DR Bank of Italy discount rate and European Central Bank 
m.r.o. rate, value in percent , 1981-1998 and 1999-2017. 




1981 2017 Change %Change
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 6.84% 3.15% -3.69% -54.0%
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 1.05% 2.17% 1.11% 105.9%
Basic metals, fabricated metal products and non-metallic mineral products 7.76% 4.09% -3.68% -47.3%
Refined petroleum products, chemical products and pharmaceuticals 2.19% 1.74% -0.46% -20.9%
Machinery and equipment 3.42% 3.11% -0.31% -9.1%
Electronics products, electrical and non-electrical equipment and apparatus 2.51% 1.61% -0.90% -35.9%
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 3.42% 1.89% -1.53% -44.7%
Food, beverages and tobacco products 2.89% 2.33% -0.56% -19.5%
Textiles, clothing and leather products 4.88% 2.06% -2.82% -57.8%
Paper, paper products and printing 1.23% 0.85% -0.38% -31.0%
Rubber and plastic products 1.24% 1.07% -0.17% -13.8%
Construction 8.93% 5.38% -3.55% -39.8%
Wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 17.59% 15.18% -2.41% -13.7%
Accommodation and food service activities 3.11% 4.95% 1.84% 59.3%
Transportation and storage, Information and communication 10.48% 12.03% 1.55% 14.8%
All remaining activities 22.46% 38.42% 15.96% 71.1%
100.00% 100.00%
Percentage of value added by sectors 
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Panel B – Dependent and independent variables statistics 
Variable name 
 
Description - formula N.obs. Min. Mean  Max. St. Dev. 
DLSH The change in the share of the 
total loans accruing to a specific 
sector,  
(Loanit/Loant) 
576 -0.0676 1.23E-18 0.1052 0.0072 
DPLOAN The percentage rate of growth of 
loans in each sector 
% Loanit 
576 -54.6955 7.7107 152.5962 16.5946 
DPLOAN – 
table 5 model 
1-B  
instrument 
The percentage rate of growth of 
loans in all sectors within the 
same technological group of the 
instrumented one 
% Loanit – instrument 
576 -22.5966 6.8285 97.0347 10.1817 
DNPRODRAT The change in the ratio of labor 
productivity in a sector to 
average labor productivity across 
all sectors  
[(VAit/Nit) / (VAt/Nt)] 




The change in the ratio of labor 
productivity in sectors within the 
same technological group of the 
instrumented one to average 




576 -0.1014 0.0003 0.0865 0.0202 
DVARAT The change in the share of the 
value added in a specific sector  
(VAit/VAt) 




the change in the share of the 
value added in sectors within the 
same technological group of the 
instrumented one  
(VAit/VAt) - instrument 
576 -0.0059 6.25E-05 0.0108 0.0023 
DBADLRAT the change in the share of the 
bad loans in a specific sector 
(BADLit/BADLt) 




the change in the share of the 
bad loans in sectors within the 
same technological group of the 
instrumented one  
(BADLit/BADLt) - instrument 
576 -0.0515 -0.0006 0.0422 0.0083 
RGG the rate of growth of real GDP 
%RG 
576 -5.2809 1.1935 4.1944 1.8524 
INFL Rate of inflation, annual 
percentage change 
%INF 
576 -0.1 2.8645 16.3934 3.6740 
DPVA the percentage rate of growth of 
value added in a specific sector 
576 -20.7119 4.7999 75.0019 7.0101 
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%VAit 
DPVA –  
model B 
instrument  
the percentage rate of growth of 
value added in all sectors within 
the same technological group of 
the instrumented one 
%VAit - instrument 
576 -15.7692 4.5762 20.2369 5.2909 
DNPROD the percentage rate of growth of 
labor productivity in a specific 
sector 
%(VAit/Nit) 




the percentage rate of growth of 
labor productivity in all sectors 
within the same technological 
group of the instrumented one 
%(VAit/Nit) - instrument 
576 -11.2659 5.1122 25.8610 5.1308 
DPBADL the percentage rate of growth of 
bad loans to a specific sector 
% BADL 




the percentage rate of growth of 
bad loans to all sectors within 
the same technological group of 
the instrumented one 
% BADL - instrument 
576 -50.1740 8.6233 93.1388 19.2643 
CAPASSRAT the banking system’s 
capital/asset ratio 
CAPt / ASSt 
544 0.0729 0.1048 0.1394 0.0173 
DCAPASSRAT the change of the banking 
system’s capital/asset ratio 
(CAPt / ASSt) 
528 -0.0177 0.0018 0.0163 0.0061 
DPCAPASSRAT the percentage rate of growth of 
the banking system’s 
capital/asset ratio 
%(CAPt / ASSt) 
528 -14.7661 2.0159 15.4771 5.6253 
DR Discount rate 592 0.00 0.0690 0.1865 0.0592 
DPINVSEC - 
table 5, model 
1 and 1-B 
 
 
The percentage rate of growth of 
gross fixed capital formation in 
each sector 
%INVSECit 
576 -39.3510 5.4127 60.4620 12.3512 
DINVSEC - 
table 5, model 
2 and 2-B 
The change of gross fixed capital 
formation in each sector 
(INVSECiit) 
576 -11832.2 398.2132 10475.3 1660.197 
DLOAN The change of total loans 
accruing to a specific sector  
(Loanit) 
576 -19557.0 1203.351 21873.00 3692.33 
DLOAN 
Instrument - 
table 5 model 
2-B 
 
The change of total loans 
accruing to all sectors within the 
same technological group of the 
instrumented one 
(Loanit)- instrument  
576 -39502.0 4924.212 58695.00 11435.10 
DVA The change of value added in a 
specific sector 





tab 5 model 
1B  
The change of value added in all 
sectors within the same 
technological group of the 
instrumented one 
(VAit) - instrument 
576 -31061.00 7164.24 39549.00 10441.12 
DPCAPSEC 
table 6, model 
1 
 
The percentage rate of growth of  
stock of non financial assets in 
each sector 
%CAPSECit 
576 -3.3676 5.7359 23.9144 4.7806 
DPCAPSEC –  
Instrument - 




The percentage rate of growth of  
stock of non financial assets in all 
sectors within the same 
technological group of the 
instrumented one 
%CAPSECit - instrument 
576 -1.7388 5.8467 20.8080 4.3839 
DPN  - table 6 
model 1 
The percentage rate of growth of 
employees in a specific sector  
%Nit 
576 -9.7222 -0.2545 10.9080 2.8614 
DPN - 
instrument - 
table 6 model 
1-B  
 
The percentage rate of growth of 
employees in all sectors within 
the same technological group of 
the instrumented one 
%Nit - instrument 
576 -6.5094 -0.4992 4.7990 2.0802 
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Table 3. Analysis of the allocation of loans accruing to a specific sector 
 Dependent Variable: DLSH. Sample: Model 1, 1B, 2, 2B 1981-2017; Model 3, 3B 1984-2017. Panel Least 
Squares. B= models with instruments 
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LIB*TEC1 – – – – 0.0056*** 
3.5145 
– 
LIB*TEC2 – – – – 0.0059*** 
4.4295 
– 
LIB*TEC3 – – – – 0.0027* 
1.7897 
– 
LIB*TEC4 – – – – 0.0041*** 
2.9989 
– 
LIB*TEC5 – – – – 0.0036* 
1.7852 
– 
LIB*TEC1&2 – – – – – 0.0056*** 
4.7729 















       Adjusted R2 0.0620 0.0693 0.0216 0.0264 0.08155 0.0808 
F Test 3.7148*** 4.8896*** 1.9072** 2.4198*** 3.5997*** 4.8599*** 
No. Observations 576 576 576 576 528 528 
Year/sector Fixed Effects NO/NO NO/NO NO/NO NO/NO NO/NO NO/NO 
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Table 4. Analysis of the rate of growth in total loans accruing to a specific sector 
 Dependent Variable: DPLOAN. Sample: Model 4, 4-B, 5, 5-B, 6, 6-b 1984-2017; Model 7, 7-b 1982 2017. Panel Least 
Squares. B= model with instruments 



























































































































TEC1&2 – -0.4818 
-0.3546 




TEC3&4&5 – -2.9054** 
-2.1628 











































































LIB*TEC1 – – – – – – 12.0208*** 
3.1879 
– 
LIB*TEC2 – – – – – – 8.3007*** 
2.5878 
– 
LIB*TEC3 – – – – – – 1.4602 
0.3957 
– 
LIB*TEC4 – – – – – – 5.8923* 
1.8310 
– 
LIB*TEC5 – – – – – – 2.7441 
0.5696 
– 
LIB*TEC1&2 – – – – – – – 10.2710*** 
 3.6411 



















         Adjusted R2 0.1719 0.2130 0.1767 0.2246 0.2068 0.2459 0.3320 0.3177 
F Test 10.9457*** 18.8329*** 12.3094*** 16.2662*** 10.1597*** 15.3241*** 15.2062*** 20.4453*** 
No. Observations 528 528 528 528 528 528 544 544 
Year/sector Fixed 
Effects 
NO/NO NO/NO NO/NO NO/NO NO/NO NO/NO NO/NO NO/NO 
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Table 5. Determinants of investments 
 Sample 1982-2017. Panel Least Squares. B=models with instruments 
 Dependent Variable: DPINVSEC Dependent Variable: DINVSEC 
Regressor Model 1 Model 1-B Model 2 Model 2-B 


























     
Adjusted R
2
 0.0318 0.0392 0.1414 0.0410 
F Test 10.1698*** 12.4038*** 47.0134*** 12.9433*** 
No. Observations 560 560 560 560 
 
 
Table 6. Production function and Solow residual calculation 
 Dependent Variable: DPVA. Sample 1981-2017. Panel Least Squares. B=model with 
instruments 









   
Adjusted R
2
 0.4775 0.3836 
Log likelihood -1751.03 -1799.116 




Table 7. Determinants of Solow residual 
 Sample 1981-2017. Panel Least Squares. B=model with instruments 
Regressor Model 1 Dependent Variable: Residual 
Model 1 table 6 
Model 1-B Dependent Variable: Residual 













TEC 1 1.9412*** 
2.8373 
- 
TEC 2 0.6768 
1.1249 
- 
TEC 3  1.3198* 
1.9232 
- 
TEC 4 0.5878 
0.9736 
- 
TEC 5 -0.7408 
-0.8236 
- 
TEC 1&2 - 0.4186 
0.7415 






   
Adjusted R
2
 0.0610 0.0845 
F Test 5.6679*** 11.6177*** 
No. Observations 576 576 
 




rank Tech c rank Ext d Tech cont Ext dep rank 81-90 rank 91-00 rank 01-10 rank 11-17 rank med
3511 Basic exclud fert, 352 Other chemicals, 3522 Drugs 2 1 4 0.653 6 5 6 6 6
322 Apparel, 3211 Spinning, 3825 Office, computing, 383 Elect. Machinery 1 2 5 0.562 9 9 9 8 9
355 Rubber products, 356 Plastic products, 3513 Synthetic resins 7 3 2 0.510 7 7 7 7 7
382 Machinery 2 4 4 0.450 3 3 4 4 4
384 Transp. Eq, 3841 Ship, 3843 Motor veichle 2 5 4 0.387 5 8 8 9 8
341 Paper and products, 3411 Pulp, paper, 342 Printing & publishing 5 6 3 0.177 8 6 5 5 6
361 Pottery, 362 Glass, 369 Non metal products, 371 Iron and steel 7 7 2 0.130 2 2 2 1 2
323 Leather, 324 Footwear, 321 Textile 5 8 3 0.060 1 1 1 2 1
311 Food products, 313 Beverages, 314 Tobacco 7 9 2 -0.077 4 4 3 3 4
Correlation with (A) -0.312 -0.422 -0.569 -0.587 -0.493
Correlation with (B) -0.617 -0.583 -0.750 -0.683 -0.688
Correlation A & B 0.642
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Appendix A Granger causality tests 
a) RGG Granger causes DPLOAN 
Sample: 1981 2019  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     RGG does not Granger Cause DPLOAN  576  21.8070 7.E-10 
 DPLOAN does not Granger Cause RGG  1.64280 0.1944 
    
    
 
b) DBADLRAT and DLSH cause each the other (Granger feedback effect) 
Sample: 1981 2019  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     DBADLRAT does not Granger Cause DLSH  576  6.22853 0.0021 
 DLSH does not Granger Cause DBADLRAT  5.76508 0.0033 
    
    
 
c) DVARAT and DLSH cause each the other (Granger feedback effect) 
Sample: 1981 2019  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     DVARAT does not Granger Cause DLSH  570  33.5383 2.E-14 
 DLSH does not Granger Cause DVARAT  4.59058 0.0105 
    
    
 
d) No Granger causality link between DPBADL and DPLOAN 
Sample: 1981 2019  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     DPBADL does not Granger Cause DPLOAN  576  0.10818 0.8975 
 DPLOAN does not Granger Cause DPBADL  0.02208 0.9782 
    
    
 
e) DPVA and DPLOAN cause each the other (Granger feedback effect) 
Sample: 1981 2019  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     DPVA does not Granger Cause DPLOAN  570  30.4528 3.E-13 
 DPLOAN does not Granger Cause DPVA  2.41305 0.0905 
    






f) No Granger causality link between DPVA and DNPROD 
Sample: 1981 2019  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     DPVA does not Granger Cause DNPROD  570  0.95507 0.3854 
DNPROD does not Granger Cause DPVA  1.33632 0.2636 
    
    
 
g1) DPLOAN and DNPROD cause each the other (Granger feedback effect) 
Sample: 1981 2019  
Lags: 1   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     DPLOAN does not Granger Cause DNPROD  586  3.69121 0.0552 
 DNPROD does not Granger Cause DPLOAN  7.38372 0.0068 
    
    
 
g2) DNPROD Granger causes DPLOAN 
Sample: 1981 2019  
Lags: 2   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     DNPROD does not Granger Cause DPLOAN  570  20.1091 4.E-09 
 DPLOAN does not Granger Cause DNPROD  1.17043 0.3110 
    
    
 
g3) No Granger causality link between DNPROD and DPLOAN 
Sample: 1981 2019  
Lags: 3   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     DNPROD does not Granger Cause DPLOAN  554  1.58283 0.1925 
 DPLOAN does not Granger Cause DNPROD  0.96489 0.4090 
    
    
 
g4) DNPROD and DPLOAN cause each the other (Granger feedback effect) 
Sample: 1981 2019  
Lags: 4   
    
     Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.  
    
     DNPROD does not Granger Cause DPLOAN  538  3.54977 0.0072 
 DPLOAN does not Granger Cause DNPROD  1.99457 0.0940 
    
    
 
